Many times various presidents, military commanders, and representatives of this great nation accentuate their apologies for target mishaps as one of the unfortunate side effects of combat.  Casualties, in times of war or invasion, can and often do happen; many times troops are even killed by friendly fire.  This does not excuse the blatant attempts to attack innocent lives by terrorists, anymore than it pardons the reckless events that happen as a result of US or allied operations.  The point is, however, that American and allied operations are often downplayed by the US administration, while terrorist tactics are seen as completely irrational and pointless.  The articles chosen for this second critical discussion of terrorism attempt to explore the methods utilized by both state and non-state actors, by delving into the methods of terrorists and the differences an similarities between terrorist organizational structure, choices of weapons, and targets and those of our own government organizations.  Illustrating how continued emphasis on terrorism may have future ramifications in regards to our current democratic ideals here in the US and the effect that this could have on future international consensus and cooperation is a paramount objective.

ACTORS

Actors are members of two distinctly opposite dimensions: state and non-state.  State actors, examined in detail by Glover (1991), are often a source of controversy; he maintains that state actions should be regarded with more disdain than the actions of non-state actors due to their illusion of maintaining power given to them by their citizens.  Glover (1991) associates the need to consider states as promoting terrorism, and argues that states are more culpable in this tactic, as they have governmental means of resolving conflict that should be employed rather than violence.  Furthermore, he examines the “psychology” of violence and terror.[1] States should be considered more culpable for their actions, then, than non-state actors, because the nature of governments is to provide for the general welfare, while non-state actions are for often specific political agendas.  A key component of terrorism that we are facing in the political realm seems to be how to distinguish a violent action as legitimate or illegitimate, ethical or unethical, or right or wrong.  Having examined this debate at length in the 1^st critical essay, the research in this presentation will be limited to the actors and methods involved, while only touching on the legitimacy of violence briefly when necessary to make certain points.

Grob-Fitzgibbon (2004) examines the German writer, Karl Heinzen’s application of ethics to both tyrannicide and revolution and compares this with the ideology of modern terrorism.  In the beginning of his article, Grob-Fitzgibbon posits the question, “How has humanity arrived at this point in history where, for the sake of political ambition, the killing of innocent human beings is deemed morally legitimate?”[2] Although the author takes a very sarcastic tone throughout the rest of his examination of Heinzen and his statements and arguments, he brings several key points to light in this debate that merit further exploration.  The first of these points to explore is Heinzen’s reference to murder as wrong, when he states, “‘any voluntary killing of another human being is a crime against humanity, that no one under any pretext whatsoever has the right to destroy another’s life and that anyone who does kill another or has him killed is quite simply a murderer.”[3] Although Heinzen describes murder as unethical in any situation, he does not advocate pacifism.  Rather, throughout the remainder of his work, Mord und Freiheit, he insists that murder, especially that which eliminates despots and their support systems is just in that it will prevent murders in the future.  In this way, Mord und Freiheit “draws explicitly on earlier notions of political violence detailed by the tyrannicide theorists, and provides a stepping stone between traditional theories of tyrannicide and the theories of modern terrorism.”[4] .He states that the only way for a peaceful and truly democratic system to evolve is through the use of revolution (and therein, murder) as a tool.  The author seems to think this argument unbalanced; however, it seems well-reasoned.

The best peek into the logic inherent in Heinzen’s argument is when he further describes murder by any actor, irregardless of war or peacetime and whether state-sanctioned or through individual or other non-state actions, to be a type of murder.  Grob-Fitzgibbon summarizes this sentiment (again quoting Heinzen) when he states, “As such, humanity must condemn all murders, for humanity ‘refers all hostile conflicts among men to the tribunal of reason, and not to that of force….Yet, as long as murder offers the only means for the attainment of this object, Humanity is also compelled to draw the sword and to become the murderess of murderers’.  If the state can use murder, so can the people.”[5]

Glover (1991) reiterates Heinzen’s point, in regards to a state actor being more culpable in the use of violence than non-state actors.[6] Some explanations for the state use of force or violence insist that states are the only legitimate perpetrators of violence.  Furthermore, Hoffman (2004) suggests that al Qaeda is using business ethics rather than personal morals in the organization and maneuvers of his transnational terrorist methods.[7] Actions are not legitimized just because an actor is a state versus a non-state entity; perpetrators of violence should be subjected to the same ethical scrutiny, regardless of the amount of power that they possess.

METHODS

Terrorists’ methods are often controversial, but no more so than methods employed by the state in exercises of power.  Some argue that violence used for any reason is unethical.  Others, especially state actors, often insist that violence is necessary in order to bring about certain desired results.  State actors advocate the use of violence in several situations, including: wartime, standard military operations, and policing.  Bruce Hoffman, among others, continuously maintains that violence is a legitimate measure when utilized by state actors, yet irrational when used by terrorist organizations to further political or religious agendas.  According to Hoffman (2006), the main objective of violence is “not to destroy property or tangible assets but to dramatize or call attention to a political cause.”[8] It would seem then, that the unadulterated use of violence could lessen the attention that the audience focuses on political objectives.

Violence is given legitimacy in the eyes of many terrorist groups, whether left-wing, ethno-nationalist, right-wing fascist/neo-Nazi, or religious in ideology, because it is seen as the only effective tool at pursuing future political ideals.  The most persistent problem of assuming that violence is the most efficient way to achieve these objectives concerns the five processes of terrorist strategy that Dr. Grussendorf related in a lecture on non-state actors.  The last stage is labeled “governance – stabilize change.”[9] This stage would not seem to come to fruition and legitimacy in the eyes of the people, involved nations, or the international community if violence were continually presented as the only strategy that a terrorist group can use to effect political change.  Much like the PLO’s success, it seems necessary to let go of violent cycles in order to gain true legitimacy on a wider scale and effect the political change originally postulated as the reason for terrorism.

ORGANIZATION

Structure of modern terrorist organizations seems to be that of networks rather than hierarchies.  This point is made by Heinzen, who goes into detail about the need for “future revolutionary groups”[10] to remain elusive to avoid exposure.  This point of networking is also mentioned by Hoffman, when he states, “In fact, the closest organizational relative to al Qaeda is perhaps a private multinational corporation.  And bin Laden himself is perhaps viewed as a terrorist CEO.”[11] Brian Jenkins provides yet another confirmation of the structure of modern terrorist systems in his speech at a 2001 conference on terrorism by stating, “Today we must think in terms of universes of like-minded fanatics in which there are galaxies and constellations, networks and ad hoc conspiracies, even individual operators.”[12] Beyond these three instances of terrorist organizations being described as networks is the work of David Tucker, who also describes modern terrorist organizations as networked versus hierarchical.  I believe that this leads to more difficulty in organizing counterterrorism strategies, because most powerful governments (like the US) are hierarchical rather than true networks.  For instance, “A network, unlike a hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by decapitation.”[13] This networked structure makes it more difficult for security measures to identify or combat modern terrorism, and it certainly adds to the difficulty of attack prediction, whether chemical, biological, or physical.

TARGETS

Targets range from single assassinations to those involving mass casualties.  Grob-Fitzgibbon (2004) quotes author David Rapoport to explain the difference between assassination and terrorism: “‘Assassination is an incident, a passing deed, an event; terrorism is a process, a way of life, a dedication.’”[14] This exploration of targets by the author again leads us to his introductory question of how the murder of innocents/civilians can ever be seen as legitimate or ethical.  In my experience, the question of innocence or guilt when touting murder as ethical is less relevant than this question: who has the right to murder? This again brings us back to the logic inherent in Heinzen’s argument.  It seems as though Heinzen would argue both anyone and no one simultaneously.  Grob-Fitzgibbon (2004) explains Heinzen’s legitimization of innocents as targets by writing, “Yet all terrorists, regardless of their position on the killing of innocents, have agreed that some killing – killing for the revolution – is justified.”[15]

This is the Treaty of Westphalia. This is the most important event in the world. Literally.

A further link between Heinzen’s tyrannicide and modern terrorist ideology is expressed when one considers that he advocates for murder of not only the tyrant, but also the entire system in place.[16] Heinzen’s theory also seemed remarkably reminiscent of Mao and his Cultural Revolution in China.  It was not only necessary for Mao to eliminate the government leaders, but also all proponents of the old system, including professionals such as teachers and government workers.  Heinzen’s argument especially relates to the culture of modern terrorism in that it repeatedly suggests that the end justifies the means.  This explanation also provides insight into the rationality for the targeting of innocent civilians in modern terrorist frameworks.  It does not matter who is killed, simply that they are being killed for a specific cause.  Therefore, targets are more fluid to the terrorist, and less absolute.[17]

WEAPONS

The end justifies the means philosophy expressed by Heinzen is also instructive when one considers the weapons that terrorists are willing to use in order to further their goals; furthermore, Heinzen alludes to many specific (though fictional) weapons that may further terrorist objectives in Mord und Freiheit as well.[18] One could argue, however, as in the preceding section on state versus non-state actors, that state actors constantly utilize this same philosophy in the exercise of ‘legitimate’ military endeavors.  A frightening example of this would be the American military’s use of cluster bombs.  Used in many conflicts, including the search for bin Laden in Afghanistan, these little bombs are dropped en masse near inhabited areas.  Little children often pick up the bombs that look like little toy rockets and play with them, only to be seriously injured or killed.  Although no one in the US administration with any decency would rejoice at the death of these innocent children, the bombs are not collected post-conflict in order to lessen the hazards to these native children.  They are simply thought of as casualties of war.  Similarly, when terrorists feel that their cause is sufficiently just, they may feel as though they are engaged in a war (no matter how illegitimate the US may consider the conflict).  This may be the logic that provides them with the impetus to use any weapons necessary to achieve their objectives. 

CONCLUSION

Grob-Fitzgibbon (2004) was useful in the exploration of the question of  who is entitled to murder, and offer one more instance of his quoting Heinzen, where it is stated, “‘If to kill is always a crime, then it is forbidden equally to all; if it is not a crime, then it is permitted equally to all….We take as our fundamental principle, taught us by our enemies, that murder, both of individuals and masses, is still a necessity, an unavoidable instrument in the achievement of historical ends.’”[19] After pondering the question of who (or which actors) are entitled to murder or the use of violence for political objectives, and while Heinzen’s arguments may seem extreme, they do present a certain amount of logic.  Also, the US version of what circumstances justify state violence seem to conflict with the international community on numerous occasions, and Jenkins (2001) sums this up best when he states, “We are often seen as promiscuous in our use of force, employing it, critics allege, to satisfy domestic political agendas or without making convincing cases for its necessity,”[20]

Beyond the argument of who is entitled to legitimately utilize violence, it was compelling to consider the effects that the current GWOT seems to impart on civil liberties.  Though not excessively covered yet, it seems that terrorism is succeeding in eroding the freedoms that we claim to have in spades, both in the US and in the spirit of international cooperation.  The only truly effective counterterrorism strategy would seem to be one that utilizes prevention in the spirit of international cooperation, not unilateral invasions on the part of the world’s one superpower, in sometime conjunction with various allies.  Jenkins also warns against the “danger of alienating some of our allies and risking that international cooperation.”[21]

In the realm of US national security, and furthermore, in the global arena, it does not seem that allowing terrorism to supercede all other crises and national security concerns has improved our stability.  Rather, the experience has weakened our democratic ideals that we, as Americans and patriots, hold so dear.  It all seems to come down to what we are willing to sacrifice in this society for furtherance of limited visions.  It seems our society, by focusing so whole-heartedly on the terrorism issue, has allowed other important ideals to slip through the cracks.  Ironically, it also appears that we have simply come around full circle to repeat the conflicts and mistakes of our predecessors.  The Cold War represented an era where the US let an ideological conflict with another power escalate into a threat of nuclear war.  Now, we are letting terrorism drive us into another ideological battle.  It is once again “good” versus “evil” and “right” versus “wrong.”  Since the global war on terror began, information is continuously flooding the international intelligence community; unfortunately, successful counterterrorism efforts will always be dependent upon separating the vital from the frivolous.  Given our rapidly changing international system, full of complex and opposing sovereign countries and cultures, the task will never be simple or absolute.

The key components of modern terrorism (which some refer to as ‘new’) can include anything from religious overtones to transnational funding and recruitment.  Five articles published from 1991-2006, examine specific instances of terrorism in light of modern events.  Each present specific arguments as to the causes of terrorism, guidelines for defining the concept of terrorism, and suggested methods for its eradication as a threat (if eradication possible).  This article will attempt to demonstrate the ambiguity resounding in the terrorism definition and causality debate, and illustrate the commonalities and basic differences inherent in the various arguments; it will also thoroughly examine the legitimacy question, which is paramount in the evolution of persistent counterterrorism strategy building, whether global or national.  Furthermore, the US’s foreign policy decisions have a direct impact on the legitimacy of the superpower; this serves to illuminate the rift between maintaining the current strategy of pre-emption and beginning to look at causality as a method for combating terrorism as a tactic rather than an evil.

Comparison & Contrasts

Most of the authors included in this research examined the term terrorism, though some may not suggest a specific definition, and they emphasized approaches to cause and effect relationships between terrorism and other factors.  All of the authors also mention a political agenda as a cornerstone of terrorist ideology, and most view terrorism as a means to an end.  Badey (1998) points to the ambiguity of defining terrorism in both the academic and security communities and postulates a framework, rather than a simplified definition of terrorism, that outlines five crucial factors: repetition, motivation, intent, actors, and effect.[2] Nuzzo (2004), however, looks further at terrorism by examining 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in a dialectical light to examine the philosophy of the “war on terror” argument and relate the historical context of our modern security situation.  Moreover, Nuzzo (2004) specifically stresses that the 9/11 attacks are being manipulated by the Bush administration to promote American preeminence, specifically in the Middle East.  Her emphasis on the understood ‘war on terror’ that existed prior to 9/11 as a cause of the increasing dissatisfaction with US policies of American preeminence is in contrast to the converse, mainstream description of 9/11 as one of the primary causes of the ‘war on terror.’[3]

Though all of the authors admit that states can sponsor terrorism, Crenshaw (2000) surveys the psychological aspects of terrorism and argues for the need to survey and comprehend groups, rather than individual personality traits.  Her focus is on the need to focus on how terrorist strategies develop, what causes the cessation of terrorism, and how we structure counter-terrorism measures to attempt to end violence, not propagate it.[4] Badey (1998), like Glover (1991), points out that “While active state participation is rare, state supported terrorism undoubtedly exists.”[5] Cunningham (2003), in comparison with Badey (1998), demonstrates the ambiguity of defining terrorism in his article, and, meanwhile, he suggests four models that frame modern counterterrorist responses, including: crime, warfare, liberation struggle, or violence in reaction to grievances.[6] Glover (1991) associates the need to consider states as promoting terrorism, and argues that states are more culpable in this tactic, as they have governmental means of resolving conflict, rather than violence.  Like Crenshaw (2000), Glover examines the ‘psychology’ of violence and terror.[7] It may be noteworthy to mention that both Glover (1991) and Badey (1998) were written before the 9/11 attacks.  The main theme that resounds through this research is whether violence (regardless of the perpetrator) has causality, and whether those reasons are legitimate.

The Legitimacy Question as Paramount

Nuzzo (2004) was extremely critical of the US as an actor.  She suggests that the “war on terror” existed prior to 9/11 and that 9/11 simply provided an excuse for the “war” and the incidents that followed, including several game changers in foreign policy.  The first mistake was made in Bush’s ‘for us or against us’ stance; then the invasion of Iraq under the pretense of keeping America safer from WMDs was launched and persisted, even after the execution of Saddam Hussein.  Finally, the foreshadowing of further intrusion in the near future in the cases of Iran, North Korea, and the Lebanese (Hezbollah)/Israeli conflict is unmistakable in the wake of US foreign policy decisions.[8] This also provides a dangerous pattern that, emulated in the future by the US and other territories, may lead to even more conflict than the promised peace if terrorism as an ideology continues to be the focus, rather than causality and legitimacy.

One could surmise that Hezbollah, rather than being allowed to ‘run amuck’ while being ignored by the Lebanese government, though not ‘officially’ sanctioned by the government, is much to the Lebanese people as the PLO was to the Palestinian people just a few decades ago.  Although the PLO began with terrorist tactics, they gained legitimacy as they developed bureaucracy and began to promote Palestinian interests to the international community, who addressed their grievances.[9] Violence may not be justifiable, but typically, people utilize force for a purpose.  To overlook that purpose would be a grievous error, and incite more of the same types of incidents.  Attempting to eradicate the effect of 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’ without surveying the causes would be akin to attempting to eliminate a pathogen responsible for an epidemic without attempting to survey the vector of the disease.

Other articles also examine legitimacy in their definitions or terrorism and/or in their outlines of causes.  Crenshaw (2000), for instance, argues that the very definition of terrorism rests in whether or not the political aims or grievances are legitimate.[10] If one takes the stance of Nuzzo (2004), the acts perpetuated by the US government that lead up to the 9/11 attacks are the impetus for the attacks; even bin Laden cites the Lebanese bombings as a reason for al Qaeda’s desire to go to war with the United States.

Excluding state actors from definitions of terrorism (as in US definitions) seems tantamount to making any state actions permissible, while simultaneously discrediting any amount of legitimacy inherent in non-state actions that include perceived terrorism tactics.  For instance, although Hoffman (2006) displays characteristics of other definitions (i.e., violence, political agendas, and group or organizationally structured objectives), he also insists that terrorism is “perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.”[11] In contrast to Hoffman (2006) on this point, Glover (1991) opposes this characteristic when he speaks of the necessity of including state actors as possible perpetrators of terrorism by stating, “… to exclude them may be to sustain a conventional blindness to important similarities to the standard cases of terrorism.”[12] Furthermore, with state actors removed from the equation, does that permit those same actors to use whatever means necessary to achieve their political/societal/religious goals?  If the citizenry is forced to follow a narrower path than the state in terms to what justifies violence, the repercussions could be tremendous.

While focusing on the question of legitimacy will certainly invoke further debate, it would seem a necessary exercise in theorizing the best ways to confront terrorism and its causality.  What is the definition of legitimacy? For instance, consider the French Revolution and the atrocities of the “regime de la terreur” that Hoffman (2006) discusses as the origin of the term ‘terror’.[13] The actions of those who were revolting against the French government were not considered legitimate until taken in a historical context and paired with republican ideals.

Conclusions

In conclusion, any analysis of the current debate must focus on comparing and contrasting the available information, while attempting to assert that terrorism can only be defined in light of legitimacy.  As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, while defining legitimacy is essential to the nexus of this debate, how are professionals supposed to determine whether individuals, sub-national groups, or even state actors are legitimate in their use of violence to achieve objectives?  Terrorism seems then, to be a contradiction that is not easily rectified, for wherein does the truth lie: in US policies on counterterrorism, in international debate, or in the minds of those who utilize terrorism as an effective means of asymmetrical warfare?  When defining terrorism, one must consider several things, including: objectivity of the analyst, nature of the imminent threat, historical considerations of similar situations, and reasons for the particular eruption of terrorism in context with the environment in which it evolves. How are we then to identify, prevent, and develop consistent strategies against a term that we have such difficulty defining?  Wading through these articles and immersed in the debate, the research into terrorism’s causes concluded with more questions than answers.

Topic: Legal Issues with Respect to Detaining Terrorist Suspects

ABSTRACT

Legal issues are at the heart of the “War on Terror Debate.”  When citizens stand accused in the US, they are guaranteed certain fundamental rights, and, according to our founding fathers, these rights are essential and must remain secure for future generations.  Terrorism causes various security risks that have been counteracted with issues running in opposition to the legal system that underscores our country’s values.  The Patriot Act, our evolving criminal justice system, and detainment facilities like Guantanamo Bay are parts of this debate, but not the basis of it.  I originally wanted to explore the way law enforcement deals with contradictions in law, which may occur when detaining criminals with suspected terrorist ties.  Since this subject seemed a bit too large in scope, and there were not many examples that contained a wealth of information in the domestic criminal sphere, utilizing US detainment policies outside of the US, specifically the US military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, allowed for a broader view of criminal justice applications in incidents associated with terrorism.

The detainment camp at Guantanamo, through forums, international debate, and even Supreme Court cases, has been at the heart of the war of terror debate since its inception.  The individuals detained there have suspected terrorist ties, though many have been held for exceptionally long periods without charges.  After sorting through the information available on the facility at Guantanamo, pressing international concerns became evident in light of changing US policies, specifically the role that US detainment practices will have on future international ideology and wartime convention.

Questions Going Into the Research

At the heart of this debate rests a multitude of questions, including the following:

(A) Does the facility at Guantanamo Bay go against international law and treaties (including the Geneva Convention),

(B) What role, if any, should the US military play in arresting and detaining those “suspected” of terrorist ties,

(C) What does the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, coupled with the added threat that American citizens can be considered enemy combatants as well, mean for the future of the US criminal justice system, and

(D) Finally, the most essential construct will be an attempt to answer how the facility at Guantanamo Bay treats enemy combatants versus POWs and other types of detainees.

How do these questions factor into the war on terror debate?

Media Coverage and Supreme Court Cases

Through the process of obtaining material to review, from articles to letters, transcripts, and opinion statements of various organizations, it became obvious that there is a wealth of information about the negative aspects of the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (GITMO), and very little of reality.  Much of this can be contributed to the US media’s love of sensationalism (face it, people tune-in to a good prison scandal).  However, GITMO is also teeming with many of the noble, hard-working military men/women (and their families) that we patriots admire and love so much.  Whether the policy that placed them there is misguided or not is something that should be considered with further research, but it will in no way detract from the important service that these people provide for our country on a daily basis.  Securing a personal interview of an OS stationed at Guantanamo Bay was one aim of this article research.  Unfortunately, due to time restraints for both of us and the sensitivity of the information, responses were not available for this submission.  Since receiving the questionnaire with his responses (though he could not comment on many of the questions), the document he returned has been listed at the end of this revision as Appendix A.

The American media in general has been fascinated with the Guantanamo Bay facility since its invention, just four months after the attacks of September 11^th.  Journalists began promoting the idea that the detainees, profiled and compartmentalized too quickly, were enemy combatants that must be far from US society and due process.  One news story specifically examined claims by the US Air Force (USAF) that a native-born Syrian, Muslim translator (an American citizen since 2001) was part of an ongoing underground effort to help the detainees.  He stood accused of passing documents on to the ‘enemy’ and leaking classified information to others in Syria, in an attempt to conspire to help terrorists[1].

According to initial reports, “Al-Halabi is charged with eight counts related to espionage, three counts of aiding the enemy, 11 counts of disobeying a lawful order, nine counts of making a false official statement and one count of bank fraud.”[2] Nearly a year later, as Al-Halabi’s court martial drew near, an article was released that emphasized the erosion of the prosecutor’s case; it went on to draw a parallel between Al-Halabi’s treatment by the USAF and escalating tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims at the facility.  One journalist argues, “The briefs submitted by prosecutors and defense attorneys reveal tensions among Muslim and non-Muslim linguists in Guantanamo’s translator operation that fueled suspicions about Al Halabi, Yee and other Muslim translators. The court papers also portray a criminal probe so riddled with errors that 14 of the initial 30 charges against Al Halabi have been dropped — including aiding-the-enemy charges that carried the death penalty.”[3] In reviewing this case of a naturalized American citizen who was a suspected terrorist, it seemed that knee jerk reactions could lead to the ‘guilty until proven innocent’ philosophy of colonial times, if we are not watchdogs for justice and democratic principle.

According to a story generated immediately after Al-Halabi accepted a plea-bargain to 4 counts of lesser charges, “Army Capt. Jason Orlich, an intelligence officer at Guantanamo, testified that he had asked a group of Muslim personnel who prayed in the building where he worked to find a different place to pray because their sessions were disruptive.  He also objected to the group’s members storing their prayer rugs in the building.”[4] Though the personnel would not fall under the definition of any of the labels offered in any part or parcel of the Geneva Conventions, the inference that Muslim prayers may offend non-Muslim personnel at the facility could add fire to an already hotly contested topic in terrorism discourse.

Indefinite Detainment Periods and Military Commissions

Though court-martials are the logical forum for a military service member to be indicted on charges in relation to terrorism or treason, civilian courts handle non-military individuals who are charged with these types of crimes.  GITMO detainment practices are where the issue gets a little greyer.  As the detainees at Guantanamo Bay are considered neither civilians nor US military service members; they are not afforded the title of prisoner at war (POW), and the only legal forum that they have been presented (of which only a few detainees have been allowed), is that of military commissions.  Has the military become the ‘world police’ in matters of national security from here on out because of the threat of terrorism?  Does the “war on terrorism” even count as a bona fide ‘war’, since there is no clear enemy or precise targets?  This is the crux of the debate that revolves around President Bush’s use of ‘wartime powers’ indefinitely, as there is no “end” of terrorism in sight.

The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, used by proponents and opponents of the GITMO alike, enlisted the Supreme Court as a quasi-mediator.  One case examines the Supreme Court decision in regards to two Chinese Muslim GITMO detainees.  The two detainees contend that they were captured unlawfully by US forces in Pakistan and were wrongfully classified as enemy combatants.  The men had been held for four years in Cuba’s Guantanamo Bay Naval base at the time, and the Supreme Court denied their appeal, stating that the detainment of the men, though based in unfounded suspicions, was outside the jurisdiction of US courts.[5]

The other case exemplified the intersection of two crucial branches of government, the executive, and the judiciary, and the way in which the ‘war on terror’ interacted with our age-old system of checks and balances between those branches.  The Supreme Court ruling in this case is a handy 185-page document that offers the court’s opinion regarding limits on presidential power.  The court weighs the conflict of Guantanamo military tribunals and military commissions as outlined by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but it also levies the weight of past domestic and international legislation (Geneva Convention, Article 15, etc.) on the case Hamdan presents against Rumsfield, et al (the US government).

Justice Stevens, who delivered the majority opinion, first noted that the Detainee Act of 2005 maintains that military tribunals should be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit.  He then contends that Hamden and other detainees are not military servicemen and are therefore not subject to military justice, and, furthermore, the Court asserts that it is folly to presume that military courts of justice are not subject to the same hierarchy as civilian court.  The Bush administration then makes an inference from the Court’s ruling that he should seek Congressional approval for his military tribunals, as a way to prevent Court intervention into the process.[6]

Upon critical analysis of this article, and in particular the 185-page Supreme Court ruling, however, there was no such implication.  Though the majority opinion offered supports the Executive’s right to pursue remedies for the detainment situations complicated by the “war on terror,” Justice Stevens specifically addresses the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 as inapplicable to pending cases, and does not speak to the constitutionality of the act.[7] However, there is no reasonable expectation that this moderation in decision-making would prevent the Court from exerting its authority over increasing legislation, especially if it contradicts sound constitutional principle.

In researching specific communities present in Guantanamo Bay, a base newsletter provided at least a glimmer of the humanity that exists within the confines of the rigid structure at the installation.  In the newsletter archives, I came across a newsletter article that reveals the attitude of the US Armed Forces towards the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfield, et al.  There is a discussion of the 5-3 decision of the Court that indicate Justice Breyer offered “‘an implicit invitation’” to the White House to seek legislation from Congress, in order to further expand the limits of executive power.[8] After reading this article, the main question was: What will Congress do if the President seeks to consolidate more power in the hands of the executive?  Will the Democratic Congress respond to appeals to repeal the Patriot Act?  Will the President’s ‘wartime powers’ be clarified further for this new type of ‘war’?

National Public Radio, which typically makes a practice of objective, “BBC-style” reporting, released an “unclassified” transcript of the KSM military tribunal.  In addition to this report, a number of news stories on television followed this story.  One favorite was that of ‘news anchor’ Jon Stewart on the Daily Show.  He makes light of KSM, satirically pointing out that he looks more like the psycho “terrorist’s roommate” than a terrorist mastermind.  KSM is one of the most interesting individuals in the ‘war on terror’.  From his American education (right here in NC), to his emboldened statements concerning his role in various terrorist attacks and attempts, he presents an image of a terrorist leader, however, from the photos of him pre-Gitmo and currently, he appears as more an astounding picture of Arabic arrogance.[9] KSM was transferred from a secret CIA prison, along with 13 other suspects, to Guantanamo in September of 2006.[10]

A thorough timeline of the events at Guantanamo Bay was somewhat difficult to locate, but throughout this research, two sources offered some insight.  Since June 26, 2002, there have been numerous DoD announcements in regards to GITMO.  This timeline presented facts fairly objectively, without taking any particular stance on security issues: defense, space, WMD, intelligence, and homeland security.  This reference aided significantly in obtaining additional sources detailing the chronology of events at GITMO.[11] The other was located within a Toronto Sun article, in which Peter Worthington, former Attorney General Ed Meese, and former Presidential speechwriter David Frum toured the Guantanamo Bay facility.  During the tour, the three men ate the same food as the detainees, were shown that the average weight gain among the 432 interred individuals was over 18 pounds, gleaned a peek into interrogation practices and techniques (according to head of interrogations at Guantanamo, Paul Nester), and got an intimate look at the facility.[12]

Additionally, upon discovery of the two aforementioned sources, a clearer timeline of events of US legislation began to emerge.  Whatever the US government has done, whether to rectify previous laws in regards to detainment practices, information sharing between agencies, and the establishment of military commissions (to try the detainees charged), has been consistently a knee-jerk reaction to events.  The legislation that the US government has passed, and the American people’s willingness to see measures that would attempt to defeat terrorism, illustrates the panic that resulted from September 11^th, 2001.  Though the focus of this article is the topic of the US Military’s detainment facility in Guantanamo Bay, the events of 9/11, coupled with US domestic legislative changes and foreign affairs’ practices, have forever changed the landscape of US wartime decisions.  It was at this point that I stumbled upon an exhibit by the International Spy Museum, which detailed US legislation fairly thoroughly, with the exception of a couple of acts that could be located elsewhere.  These two timelines are located as Appendix B and C, and they seem to provide the best sequence of events, in regards to a general overview of Guantanamo history and US legislation that specifically references terrorism.

International Implications and the Geneva Conventions

Does the facility at Guantanamo Bay go against international law and treaties?  Many opponents of the facility insist that it violates not only the principles of the Geneva Convention, but also specific Articles.  The Geneva Convention, upon inspection, does give specific instructions on how individuals are to be detained during a time of war.  This includes issues such as military tribunals, holding without charging detainees, arrests made outside of US jurisdiction by US intelligence agencies, other law enforcement, or the military, and treatment of detainees (including interrogation practices and living conditions).

In stumbling across various pleadings from Human Rights Watch, an international non-governmental organization (NGO), there exist examples of international criticism of US detainment practices at the Guantanamo Bay facility.  As it is an international NGO, the US government has no implicit responsibility to respond to its accusations or demands, but this reference does offer a glimpse into various sides of the debate.[13] The complexity of the events at Guantanamo, and the corresponding international reactions to the US government’s ongoing, indefinite detainment of various prisoners, whose classification is shadowed by terms like ‘enemy combatant,’ rather than the Geneva Conventions terms: ‘prisoner of war,’ ‘alien,’ or ‘civilian,’ (Article 75).  These are the main factors that further complicate an already complex terrorist suspect detainment system.  Not only are the 191 countries that hold membership in the UN unable to agree on a definition for the term ‘terrorist,’ but the Geneva conventions are being accused of being too vague to solidly apply to the problems of the ‘war on terror’ era.  According to Article 5 of the General Provisions sections of the Geneva Conventions:

3. If a Protecting Power has not been designated or accepted from the beginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, the International Committee of the Red Cross, without prejudice to the right of any other impartial humanitarian organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to the Parties to the conflict with a view to the designation without delay of a Protecting Power to which the Parties to the conflict consent. For that purpose it may inter alia ask each Party to provide it with a list of at least five States which that Party considers acceptable to act as Protecting Power on its behalf in relation to an adverse Party and ask each adverse Party to provide a list or at least five States which it would accept as the Protecting Power of the first Party; these lists shall be communicated to the Committee within two weeks after the receipt or the request; it shall compare them and seek the agreement of any proposed State named on both lists.

Because the International Committee of the Red Cross was instrumental in the organization of the Geneva Conventions, and the agency is described in the document as an “impartial humanitarian organization,” it seems that the intent of the states was that, in cases of international conflict, the warring parties would agree to certain terms, upon which each side’s honor would be illustrated.  Though these conventions of war were a means of setting guidelines for sovereign states, it seems shortsighted to presume that transnational terrorist organizations would take exception to the terms to which 194 countries signed off in 1949.

Meanwhile, Article 75 of the Geneva Conventions illuminates the dangers of a future in which detainees can be denied POW or civilian status.  Article 75, sections 3 and 4 specifically offer the most insight into the current situation in Guantanamo, and the rights that are supposed to be afforded to the detainees there:

3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.

4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, which include the following: (a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence; (b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual penal responsibility; (c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account or any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; (d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law; (e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence; (f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; (g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure; (i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgement pronounced publicly; and (j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.

Upon examination of Article 75 (and especially section 4), it seems as though practices that have come to light in reference to Guantanamo Bay, from the accused having the right to examine witnesses and evidence to the right to immediate charges, may indeed be in conflict with this article.  How or whether this can be explained remains a mystery, and perhaps some administration officials, up to and including then President Bush or current President Obama, would contend that it would not have to be explained.  Does the US truly have the authority to label, detain, and try (or keep from trial) people the way it sees fit once they have been accused of terrorism?

The US Executive and Guantanamo’s Future

The Administration’s Stance

Though President Bush claimed in September of 2006 “his administration would ‘move toward the day when we can eventually close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay,’” the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) transferred 14 terrorist suspects, previously held in secret prisons, to Guantanamo Bay less than 2 months after he made the statement.[14] Several supporting statements then emerged from leading military officials, (such as Navy Rear Admiral Harry Harris, Jr.) stating that the facility at Guantanamo must remain open “for as long as this country is fighting a war on terror.”[15] The key emphasis picked up by the Admiral on then President Bush’s statements made in September seemed to be on his use of the word “eventually.”

While the war on terror continues, it will be necessary to have a facility to house ‘enemy combatants,’ a term that looms heavily in the suffocating cloud of the war on terror debate.  According to the article, “Harris said it’s important to keep in mind that the detainees here are dangerous enemy combatants intent on killing Americans.”[16] In this regard, it seems that a lot of supposition is being offered towards determining the guilt of detainees, rather than formal charges and trials.  For all of their insinuated flaws, at least the military tribunals are subject to regulations established by the UCMJ, and have some basis in allowing individuals to proclaim their innocence or guilt.

However, the main ethical questions that surround the military tribunal debate are not secondary to this discussion.  One of these is why do we have a system where discovery of evidence by the defendant is impossible, with detainees presumed guilty until proven innocent.  In addition, Guantanamo Bay Naval Base “has no civilian legal authority (you can’t get a marriage license there, and you can’t be arraigned) and U.S. military authority is limited.  According to the Department of Justice, the prison is not indisputably U.S. territory, nor does it necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of any foreign entity.”[17]

Similar to the Bush administration’s desire to see the facility disappear (at least as a detention facility), at some unknown date, the term ‘enemy combatant,’ and its application to the detainees at the facility (and others at detainment camps elsewhere around the world), has become equally vague.  There are rumblings in the White House of the necessity to close Guantanamo per the President Bush’s former remarks to the American people.  Senior administration officials even sought to pressure President Bush to close the facility quickly, as any delay in doing so could cause further international scrutiny into the U.S.’s capture and detainment practices.  The preponderance of debate surrounding the legality of military tribunals, and the inability of the detainees to demand swift trials, could lead to larger legal dilemmas that might serve to complicate the war on terror.  Specifically, the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and the former Secretary of State, Condeleeza Rice, have been stressing since January of 2006 that “Guantanamo’s continued existence hampered the broader war effort.”[18] According to the Times, “Mr. Gates’s challenge has sent a ripple through the White House, because it forced officials to confront the question of whether Mr. Bush was actually moving to fulfill his stated desire to close the detention facility.”[19]

Conclusion

Although aware that those in the Criminal Justice field may have much more of an intimate understanding of the inner workings of our US legal system, this article is presented from an Anthropology/Political Science background.  Throughout the research of Guantanamo Bay, and in the attempt to link this issue to the broader issue of criminal justice’s evolution in the war on terror, key themes appeared.  The field of Criminal Justice will be shaped by the war on terror, but only to the extent that the discipline allows that change.  Perhaps some changes should be welcomed, especially those that bring security, many may conclude.  But, if in the days ahead in this seemingly never-ending struggle, we have knee jerk policy and legislative actions to the horrors of terrorism, maybe we will be giving up some of the principles which are central to our nation’s legitimacy.  We must make sure that our society does not jump to hasty conclusions, undo centuries of criminal philosophy, or undermine our ethical responsibility to international norms.

Part of legality is determining what is right.  This is not just the definition of what is right that is presented by law enforcement, or society, or even the international community.  This is the right that is personified by our freedom, our pursuit of happiness, and, in general, the choices we make for the short lives we have to pursue.  We have gotten to the point in our society that we think that we have to control everything; we have to make sure that society behaves accordingly.  The problem is that people are different; people have different dreams, from the way that they practice religion, to the way that they raise their children, to the way that they view laws and freedom.  Now, that is not to say that any individual has the right to murder, or steal, or even abstain.  People that abstain from the political process are culpable in that they never actively seek to make a difference.

States are also determinants of their own legality, encompassed in a long existent term known as sovereignty.  Typically, citizenship maintained by individuals serves to not only protect them, but also bind them in civic duty to their sovereign state.  The US Republic is a construct of the desire to provide the State’s citizens with every opportunity to exercise freedom in decision-making, while maintaining the State’s role in protecting citizens from each other and the aggression of outsiders.  Other types of governments have different aims; the States each possess the sovereign authority to shape their governments and citizens without intrusion from other States and are entitled to that authority no matter what their political ideology.  The only exception would be an extreme case in which an international collective has decided that it must intervene (key examples being Hitler’s Germany and Darfur, the latter never assisted).

The main idea in our responses to terrorism is noble.  We want to prevent loss of American life and property, things which past terrorists have declared as necessary targets for the actualization of their political goals.  In going after those that we believe to be terrorists, however, we must be careful how we proceed.  Some things can not be reversed or undone, and often these actions cause domino or ripple effects in our societies that seem nearly irreparable.  Furthermore, it seems that in our quest to extinguish terrorism, we may be lighting new fires with our approach to this frightening ideology.  Though their actions are inexcusable, and exhaustive analysis may prove less effective in some cases than swift action, it has to be a part of the mending process to attempt to uncover why these terrorists are acting out against our society.

In the spirit of this academic article specifically, it is also necessary to consider the way that we treat our detainees, and what effect their treatment, coupled with our rationale for holding these ‘enemy combatants,’ will have on our position as ‘leader of the free world.’  Will our actions appear as the center of a staunch and successful campaign against terrorism, or the flailing of a desperate and frightened superpower, struggling to hold its status in the international arena?  More importantly, will the way in which we classify and contain terrorist suspects cause more converts to the terrorist way of political persuasion, or less?  For in the end, if we can not stop this grim cycle from continuing, then our actions will be seen as folly, and, furthermore, the way in which we behave will mold the history of our democratic ideals for posterity.

APPENDIX A

Questions about Guantanamo Bay – Research Assignment Interview

Interviewer: Melissa D. Cameron, JUST 6502, East Carolina University

1. What is the weather like typically?

Typically the weather here is humid and hot.  Occasional rain showers in the spring, lots of rain in the “winter” months and hurricane season from July-November.  Unlikely for a hurricane since the path is often broken up by other islands and the hurricane is weakened to a tropical storm.

1. Are there many pests (bugs, rats, cockroaches, etc.), and, if so, what types?

There are banana rats, which are as big as possums. There are lots of mosquitoes, the base is fumed for them often. No other kind of pests really if there are none that are annoying.  There are iguanas and they are protected, we must brake for them and respect them in their environment.

1. How permanent are the other personnel that you work with?  Do positions change a lot, or are the same people posted in the same role for a long period of time?

People are constantly changing

1. Does the prison at Guantanamo Bay mirror US prisons, and, if so, in what ways?

No comment

1. Is there a “warden” of the prison there, so to speak?  What is the Navy’s equivalent of that position?

No comment- not my area of expertise

1. What is your occupational specialty?  What are your daily duties?

I work in operations and duties consist of clearances for personnel on and off the base.

1. How connected is family life on base?  Is Guantanamo Bay Naval Base very similar to other overseas US bases?

It’s not similar to other bases due to the isolation.  There are limited facilities for families.  The families that are here seem to do well and kids are happy.

1. How does a US base on foreign soil operate in general?  Is there anyone in the Cuban government that the US military has to appease or inform as to situations on or conditions at the base?  In other words, does the US have to balance governmental relations with the country its base occupies, or are we in complete control of the situation, though situated on foreign soil?

Refer to the State Department Representative.

1. What countries’ citizens represent the makeup of the detainees?

No comment

APPENDIX B

Guantanamo’s History

Ø       1494 Christopher Columbus landed briefly at Guantanamo Bay, which got its
name from the Taino Indians.

Ø       1741 The British landed at Guantanamo with 4,000 soldiers, renamed it
Cumberland Bay, and intending to march on Santiago de Cuba until stiff guerrilla
resistance persuaded them to withdraw … forever.

Ø       1898 U.S. Marines landed at Guantanamo Bay. Two were killed on June 11 to
become the first casualties of the Cuban-American war.

Ø       1903 President Teddy Roosevelt signed an agreement with the Cuban government
leasing Guantanamo Bay as a coaling and naval base for $2,000 in gold coins a
year.

Ø       1934 The administration of Franklin Roosevelt signed a 999-year lease with
Cuba’s Batista government for the 116-square-km area – roughly the size of
Manhattan. Today, Gitmo is the oldest existing U.S. military base outside U.S.
territory.

Ø       1959 After Fidel Castro’s revolution, the U.S. banned military personnel
station at Guantanamo from entering Cuba; Castro called the base a “knife in the
heart of Cuba’s dignity,” and refused to cash the annual $4,085 rent cheque that
the U.S. pays Cuba every year.

Ø       1962 After the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro stopped selling fresh water to
the base from the Yateras river northeast of the base. With 60 million litres of
water in storage, the U.S. rationed water and built a desalination plant (which
still stands), later replaced by reverse osmosis to produce 5.7 million litres
of water a day.

Ø       1986-93 Coups and violence in Haiti resulted in some 55,000 refugees being
housed in tents (Camp Bulkeley) on Guantanamo’s golf course — until a U.S.
court ruled in 1993 that the camp was unconstitutional. Today the Haitians are
gone, but the golf course has never fully recovered because water is too
valuable to waste on the fairways, only the greens.

Ø       2002 The first suspect al-Qaida and Taliban “enemy fighters” arrive from
Afghanistan and are detained at camps Delta, Iguana, and the now-closed Camp
X-Ray. Of more than 700 detainees, about 300 have since been released or
transferred to other countries.

Ø       2005 Amnesty International requests that the Guantanamo facility be closed
–followed by similar requests by the UN and European Union.

Ø       2006 In June, three detainees commit suicide by hanging. There have been 41
suicide attempts, which the Americans feel were politically motivated.

Ø       2006 On June 19, the U.S. Supreme Court overrules the administrations claim
that the Geneva Convention doesn’t apply to al-Qaida or Taliban prisoners, and
orders that terms of the convention apply to detainees – which the U.S. military
has scrupulously complied with.

Ø       2006 In September, President Bush says 14 “enemy combatants” held by the CIA
will be transferred to Guantanamo, indicating that as long as he’s around, so
will be Gitmo as a detention facility.[20]

APPENDIX C

US Legislation

A.      The Alien and Sedition Acts (1798)

B.       Alien Immigration Act (1903)

C.       Espionage Act (1917)

D.      Sabotage Act (1918)

E.       Sedition Act (1918)

F.       Deportation Act (1920)

G.      Immigration Act (1924)

H.      Foreign Agents Restoration Act (1938)

I.         Alien Registration Act (1940)

J.        Anti-Subversive Activities Act (1940)

K.       Internal Security Act (1950)

L.       Communist Control Act (1954)

M.     Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (1996)

N.      The Patriot Act (2001)

O.      The Detainee Treatment Act (2005)

P.       The Military Commissions Act of 2006[21]

From Retuers

Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister Abdelati Obeidi told Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou on Sunday that Libya wants to end fighting in the country, Greek officials said.

“It seems that the Libyan authorities are seeking a solution,” Foreign Minister Dimitris Droutsas said after the envoy met Papandreou. “There needs to be a serious effort for peace and stability in the region.”

It still remains to be seen whether or not this is a bluff by Gaddafi to try and get the UN/NATO coalition to reduce their bombing of Libya. Gaddafi and his inner circle could be showing genuine interest in a cease-fire, however. It is rumored that Gaddafi is running out of Libyan soldiers and will soon have to rely only on mercenaries from Africa. If he does wish to continue the fight, he does have plenty of money to pay the mercenaries.

If a cease-fire is agreed upon, it would seem that the UN resolution has been fulfilled. Rest assured, American boots, shoes, sandals, or whatever you may will remain on the ground for far longer after that. This is, of course, on top of America’s naval and air presence.

Obama signed the order, known as a presidential “finding”, within the last two or three weeks, according to four U.S. government sources familiar with the matter.

Such findings are a principal form of presidential directive used to authorize secret operations by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA and the White House declined immediate comment.

News that Obama had given the authorization surfaced as the President and other U.S. and allied officials spoke openly about the possibility of sending arms supplies to Gaddafi’s opponents, who are fighting better-equipped government forces.

The United States is part of a coalition, with NATO members and some Arab states, which is conducting air strikes on Libyan government forces under a U.N. mandate aimed at protecting civilians opposing Gaddafi.

In interviews with American TV networks on Tuesday, Obama said the objective was for Gaddafi to “ultimately step down” from power. He spoke of applying “steady pressure, not only militarily but also through these other means” to force Gaddafi out.

It looks like Mission Creep has finally arrived. The objective has gone from protecting civilians via airstrikes, to providing them with weapons and money in order to wage war against Gaddafi, to ultimately deposing Gaddafi (aka: regime change).

Furthermore, this all comes on top of the Libyan Interim government, based in Benghazi, announcing that it has already established a Central Bank and is in oil talks with the West. So much for strictly humanitarian foreign adventure that was only supposed to take days. As of now, it seems like America is in for the long haul, but hopefully not to the extent of Iraq.

Syria has generally been known for its ruthless government that has been largely oppressive to its neighboring countries and its own citizens. Syria has recently taken its reputation to a new level after 15 demonstrators were killed last week, drawing 20,000 more to march in protest of al-Assad’s actions. There have also been reports of roughly 800 demonstrators gone missing since protests began.

Protests in Syria come after a wave of revolutions in the Middle East, starting with Tunisia, then spreading to Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Libya. With NATO forces poised in the Mediterranean Sea, the Syrian government’s next moves could be its last. Nonetheless, Western intervention has seen as an unnecessary move as many protesters and demonstrators in the Middle East would rather have their revolutions remain theirs without any foreign help.

Here’s a great speech by Jack Hunter about the difference between the last several decades of Big Government Republicanism versus the genuine conservative movement of Barry Goldwater and Ron Paul.

While the defection of top military officials may be hard for Saleh to swallow, he will have even more trouble coping with the rejection of his own Hashid tribe. Tribal elders, citing overwhelming casualties of innocent Yemenis, has deemed Saleh to be illegitimate and unworthy of the role as president. Oddly enough, this coincided with the defection of al-Ahmar, a fellow Hashid tribesman. However, al-Ahmar is a longtime bedfellow of Saleh. While his defection serves as a win for the opposition in the short term, he is seen as “corrupt” and “not respected” by the Yemeni people. The Hashid tribe is undoubtedly setting up to have another one of their own in power.

The writing is on the wall for a military coup and the fuse is lit for a civil war. There could very well be a Libyan type situation where Saleh loyalists square off with the opposition. However, it is becoming quite clear that Saleh, unlike Gaddafi, would not necessarily have the upper hand. Yemen has a wonderfully armed and advanced (compared to its economy) military unlike Libya, thanks almost completely due to American aid. If many of these arms, munitions, tanks, etc. are not retained by Saleh and pro-Saleh forces, then a fierce and bloody battle could ensue. On the ground reports of opposing tanks literally facing one another are only a precursor to what could happen. In addition, there runs the possibility of intra-tribal conflict for the Hashid tribe: they could either join the al-Ahmar camp or the Saleh camp. As much as this has been overlooked by the media, the possibility of a dispute amongst the Hashids is particularly inflammatory. If the Hashid tribe, the strongest in Yemen, succumbs to infighting, the opportunity will be ripe for a new tribe to rise to the top. Such competition between the Hashid tribe and others could get quite ugly. The outlook is grim for the Hashid tribe, and this seems almost certain.

Unlike Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, Yemen has a real terrorism problem. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) calls the rugged mountains of Yemen its home. As I have noted before, AQAP is currently the primary threat to the US and has launched a barrage of foiled attacks on America. The resulting power vacuum (read: a non-American backed regime), if Saleh is deposed, would give AQAP even more autonomy and freedom to execute its sinister message. It is for this exact reason that officials in America are probably having a nervous breakdown. Another of their closest “allies” in the War on Terror is about to fall. Basically, there are three options for the US: let Yemen do as it pleases (not a remote possibility, I know), continue to back Saleh, or throw support behind an opposition figure conducive to American interests.

Other problems that are by no means peripheral are the Houthi rebellion in the north and secessionist movement in the south. Each of these runs an increased risk of boiling over now that the government in Sana’a is being seen as more illegitimate than ever.

As American backed leaders in the Middle East continue to fall one after another, American foreign policy and its formerly “secure” interests are crumbling with it. Yemen, however, runs the serious risk of degenerating into a state that makes Pakistan look like a paradise.

Daniel Hannan lists three reasons why European intervention in Libya is an illogical move.
1) Opposition forces do not want us there
2) Qaddafi wants us there to justify his actions
3) It’s expensive

The President does not have the power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation. (12/20/2007)

As the pro-peace candidate, it’s difficult to completely fathom exactly why U.S. troops are currently being shipped out to the Libyan coast in what seems like a pre-emptive strike, a prelude to a troops-on-the-ground invasion.
While Republicans have responded to Mr. Obama’s actions by stating that he has reacted too slow, Democrats have justified Mr. Obama’s action by stating that military action was necessary anyway. Nonetheless, Libya served no “actual or imminent threat to the nation.” But now it does.

What started as a Libyan revolt now turned into another Western crisis in the Middle East. Intervention in Libya will be costly, not in the form of military casualties, but instead a severe blow to US-Middle Eastern relations overall. Once again, the United States, along with its Western Allies have intervened in the domestic affairs of foreign nations: it’s bound to piss off somebody.

Both parties in Congress have turned into War Parties. The notion of negotiation, peace, and non-intervention has completely swept over the minds of all elected leaders in Washington, DC. While some may argue that the actions against Libya are at the very least being done with allies rather than unilaterally, the argument still does not justify coercive measures against Libya to begin with. The Libyan civil war was exactly that- a Libyan Civil War.
U.S. interests in the Middle East are largely centered on the effective grab of resources at whatever cost. Seeing that Libyan rebels were about to lose grasp of their effectiveness in the field, I feel it is safe to say that prolonging turmoil in the region keeps oil prices high, which in turn produces higher oil revenue for the Federal Government as Americans pay their gas tax every time they pump gas into their cars.

Europeans have been largely supportive of this measure because of a connection with Mr. Obama and a visible opportunity to gain headway in the Middle East before the United States claims victory on its own. For countries like France or Italy, having a say in the future of their southern neighbors is more important than engaging an enemy as far away as, say, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Iran.